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AN INTERPLANT TEST OF THE EFFICIENCY WAGE 
HYPOTHESIS* 
PETER CAPPELLI AND KEITH CHAUVIN 
The analysis that follows tests the shirking model of efficiency wages by 
examining the relationship between rates of employee discipline and relative wage 
premiums across plants within the same firm. The structure of this data set controls 
for many of the problems that confound other tests of efficiency wage arguments, 
and the results suggest that greater wage premiums are associated with lower levels 
of shirking as measured by disciplinary dismissals. Shirking and discipline are also 
lower where conditions in the labor market raise the costs associated with shirking 
by making it more difficult to find alternative employment. It is less clear, however, 
whether the wage in this case is necessarily efficient in the sense of generating 
reductions in discipline sufficient to offset the costs of the wage premium. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Efficiency wage models are based on the notion that there is a 
relationship between relative wage levels and worker productivity, 
broadly defined, which in turn explains a variety of otherwise 
puzzling behavior such as the presence of involuntary unemploy-
ment. Perhaps the most popular of these arguments have been 
those suggesting that wage premiums and the threat of losing them 
create incentives for workers to reduce unproductive behavior or 
"shirking." The structure and implications of such efficiency wage 
arguments have been debated at length, but there have been few 
attempts to test empirically the hypothesis that wage premiums 
can reduce shirking. This paper provides a direct test of the main 
implications of the shirking efficiency wage model using plant-level 
data from the auto industry. The results suggest that wage 
premiums are in fact associated with lower levels of disciplinary 
problems, as the shirking models of efficiency wages imply. But it is 
less clear whether the overall benefits of the reduction in shirking 
exceed the cost of the wage premium. 
II. SHIRKING AND EFFICIENCY WAGES 
The argument for a positive relationship between worker 
productivity and wage levels began in development economics 
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where the connection was physiological: higher wages provided a 
better diet which in turn permitted greater effort and output (e.g., 
Leibenstein [1957], Bliss and Stern [1978]). Contemporary ver-
sions of the efficiency wage argument rely on the costs associated 
with dismissal to provide an incentive for workers to be productive 
and avoid shirking. Shapiro and Stiglitz [1984], for example, note 
that in the absence of jobs suited to piece rates, it is difficult for 
employers to monitor job performance continuously and therefore 
to adjust wages downward when performance falls. Instead, they 
argue that employers rely on occasional monitoring and the threat 
of dismissal if workers are caught shirking to provide the incentive 
for them to maintain their performance. A worker would have no 
incentive to avoid being fired at full employment and market-
clearing wages, however, because they could immediately find an 
equivalent job at the same rate of pay. So employers pay a premium 
above market rates to create an incentive for workers to keep their 
current job. When all employers raise their wages, there is an 
excess supply of labor at that wage and involuntary unemploy-
ment: some workers with a reservation wage below the new market 
level remain unemployed.1 
Theoretical arguments aside, the important empirical ques-
tion for efficiency wage arguments is whether there is any evidence 
of a relationship between wage premiums and performance, and 
then whether the overall benefits from reduced shirking outweigh 
the costs of the wage premium (they should be equal at the 
margin). There is anecdotal evidence for some kind of an efficiency 
wage effect, such as the fact that many firms pay above market 
rates as a matter of policy and presumably do so because of the 
gains such a policy offers (see, e.g., Milkovich and Newman [1987, 
p. 210]). But there have been few attempts to test even a weak form 
of the efficiency model—are there productivity gains at all from 
wage premiums—because it is difficult to identify and control for 
exogenous, nonwage factors that might affect worker productivity, 
such as differences in the quality of workers and in the nature of 
their jobs. It is also difficult econometrically to avoid the identifica-
tion problem: are higher wages the cause or the result of greater 
worker productivity?2 
1. See Katz [1086J, Stiglitz [19861, and Akcrlof and Yellen f1986] for reviews of 
the efficiency literature. 
2. Raff and Summers [1987] provide a historically based examination of Henry 
Ford's §5 day wage plan and find some support for efficiency wage effects. Leonard 
[19871 examines levels of supervision across firms and finds for some occupations 
that it is higher at firms where wage premiums are higher, the opposite of what 
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III. PREVIOUS RESEARCH 
Although attempts to test efficiency wage models as such have 
been rare, previous research has examined the relationships 
between wage premiums and some aspects of productivity. The 
conclusions from this research suggest that if the efficiency wage 
effects exist, they may be offset empirically by other effects. For 
example, a wage premium of the kind associated with an efficiency 
wage may produce income effects that could reduce any positive 
relationship with productivity. One way to purchase leisure where 
workers cannot control their work schedule is by shirking: absen-
teeism, reducing work effort on the job, etc. The price of that 
leisure includes the expected cost associated with being caught. 
Employers are unlikely to set a wage unilaterally that leads to a 
reduction in effort, but such wage premiums might be established 
through collective bargaining, for example. Taylor [1961] and 
Walters [1977] argue that when wages for British miners were 
raised above market rates, the miners used the increases to 
purchase additional leisure through absenteeism and shirking. 
Hirsch and Hausman [1983] find econometric support for this 
argument and an overall negative relationship between productiv-
ity and the miner's wage increase. 
Industrial psychologists have also examined the relationship 
between pay levels and performance, and while none of their 
studies provides a rigorous test of efficiency wage arguments per se, 
some of the conclusions are relevant. The stream of research most 
relevant to the efficiency wage position hi psychology is known as 
"equity theory" [Adams 1963], which examines the relationship 
between relative pay levels and productivity-related job behavior. 
Equity theory borrows heavily from Adam Smith's [1776] notions 
about the role of comparisons in job choice. Stated simply, workers 
compare the inputs they bring to a job (skill, effort, etc.) and the 
outcomes from the job (pay and nonpecuniary benefits) with inputs 
and outcomes for jobs they choose as comparisons. If workers feel 
undercompensated relative to their comparisons, they may redress 
this perceived inequity or cognitive dissonance by adjusting their 
inputs downward (shirking), leaving their job (turnover), 
efficiency wage arguments would suggest if supervision is thought of as providing 
monitoring that reduces shirking (i.e., supervision costs are a substitute for 
shirking costs). Whether this is a good test of shirking depends on whether 
supervision is a good proxy for shirking. The fact that supervisors may also perform 
some higher skill aspects of production work, in addition to monitoring perfor-
mance, suggests that the relationship may be a complicated one. 
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"rationalizing" the discrepancy—reevaluating their inputs and 
outcomes, choosing new comparisons, etc.—or some combination 
of the three that will reestablish a sense of equity. (One problem 
with this literature is the difficulty in explaining which option will 
dominate.) Similarly, if they feel overcompensated, in the spirit of 
efficient wage arguments, they may in theory improve their 
performance, reduce turnover, or again rationalize the discrepancy 
away. 
As Akerlof [1984] notes, laboratory studies based on models of 
equity comparisons found that subjects who were made to feel 
overpaid relative to a control group reduced this inequity by 
increasing their inputs and outperforming their more equitably 
paid colleagues, as efficiency wage arguments would predict [Adams 
and Rosenbaum 1962; Pritchard et al. 1972].3 When these experi-
ments were continued for more than one day, however, the 
overpaid workers soon dealt with the perceived inequity by rational-
izing away any sense of overpayment—reevaluating their contribu-
tions and choosing new comparisons. One way to think of this 
rationalization process is that the workers come to see themselves 
as being in a different, higher-wage labor market. Productivity 
then fell back to the level of the equitably paid subjects [Vroom, 
1964; Lawler et al., 1968]). 
One problem with these laboratory studies is that the costs 
associated with dismissal, which drive the efficiency wage hypothe-
sis, have been insignificant, especially when compared with full-
time employment. But if respondents do rationalize away any sense 
of overpayment even where a very obvious market premium is 
paid, then perhaps the importance of the wage premium as an 
incentive not to shirk is reduced.4 
3. These same studies, however, found that workers who were overpaid on a 
piecework basis dealt with the inequity by reducing their inputs and productivity; 
with inequitable piece rates, the argument goes, the perceived inequity in earnings 
gets worse with increased output, so reducing output reduces the rate of inequity. 
4. A related stream of research developed by March and Simon [1958J 
addresses this concern by examining the relationship between alternative job 
opportunities and productivity in actual jobs (e.g., Smith, Kendall, and Hulin 
T1969]). But with the exception of weak relationships with turnover [Hulin, 
Roznowski, and Hachiya, 19851, they find no relationship between opportunities in 
the labor market, broadly denned, and productivity, also broadly defined. Unfortu-
nately, these studies also may not accurately assess the efficiency wage hypothesis 
because they do not attach wages to current jobs or to measures of job opportunities 
making it difficult to assess accurately the costs associated with dismissal. The test 
we outline below addresses both problems by examining the efficiency wage 
hypothesis in an actual industrial setting where labor markets and alternative 
wages can be accurately identified. 
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IV. THE MODEL AND DATA 
The test of the relationship between shirking and wage 
premiums that we propose uses a unique set of plant-level data for 
1982 taken from the internal records of a large manufacturing 
company.5 The characteristics of these data address many of the 
problems noted above that plague econometric tests of the effi-
ciency wage model. First, many of the exogenous factors that might 
affect worker performance are standardized across plants. For 
example, all of the plants included in the study are represented by 
the same union, the United Auto Workers, and are covered by the 
same labor agreement which standardizes virtually all of the terms 
and conditions of employment across plants. All of the data are for 
production workers, and production jobs are virtually identical 
within categories of plants (e.g., assembly versus component 
plants); the characteristics of the jobs and of the workers needed to 
fill them do not differ. Second, management's personnel policies on 
issues such as shirking and discipline are centrally controlled and 
are generally identical across all plants as are the union's policies 
for dealing with management on these issues.6 Plant managers 
might be expected to differ in where and how they exercise 
discipline, but the union may appeal all discipline cases through the 
contractual grievance procedure, and the collective bargaining 
agreement states that a common, companywide Appeal Committee 
will rule on all grievances unresolved at the plants. The fact that a 
central body has de facto oversight for discipline cases across all 
plants serves to standardize discipline practices across those 
5. The company requests anonymity as a condition of using the data. 
6. Local collective bargaining agreements exist at the plant level, but they 
cannot alter the national agreements and are generally limited to work rules issues 
such as assigningjob classifications. 
Of course, the loss of a wage premium may not be the only cost 
associated with dismissal. These other costs, such as the possibility 
of a period of unemployment if caught shirking and dismissed, may 
also deter shirking independent of any concern about losing the 
wage premium. But the possibility that wage premiums may 
generate income effects or that workers may rationalize them away 
suggests that the relationship between wage premiums and a 
reduction in shirking may in fact be ambiguous and needs to be 
tested empirically. 
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plants. It would therefore be difficult for disciplinary practices and 
standards to vary across plants (e.g., with economic circumstances) 
and to create problems of simultaneity. In short, not only are 
measures of performance and shirking comparable across plants, 
but virtually all of the exogenous factors that could affect shirking 
and discipline are common across plants. 
Finally, because wages and other aspects of compensation are 
established through a companywide collective bargaining agree-
ment, we know that they cannot suffer from the identification 
problem outlined above: wages in each plant obviously are not 
affected by differences in productivity across plants because they 
are set centrally and are identical across all plants.7 
Wages can, however, be a cause of differences in productivity 
across plants. These workers certainly appear to earn a wage 
premium above market rates;" and although the wage rate for 
px-oduction workers is the same across all plants, the size of their 
wage premium varies considerably across plants. The labor market 
for the unskilled and semi-skilled jobs that make up production 
work in this manufacturing industry is limited geographically to a 
reasonably small area, and unskilled workers focus their job 
searches within that area.9 By comparing the hourly wage paid in 
each plant to the prevailing wage in the plant's labor market, 
denned here as the average hourly wage for production work in 
each Standard Metropolitan Statistical Area (SMSA), we can assess 
the extent of the wage premium above the market rate at each 
plant—what a worker has to lose if dismissed.10 That premium 
7. In addition, wage rates are an accurate proxy for comparing total compensa-
tion across plants relative to their labor markets because the terms and conditions 
of employment cannot vary across plants. For example, plants cannot offset higher 
wage rates relative to their labor markets with lower benefits and worse working 
conditions. 
8. Production workers in this industry in 1982 earned approximately 150 
percent of the average hourly wage for similar production work in the economy as a 
whole [Employment, and Earnings, 1982], and wor-kers in this company earned 
more than the industry average. Wages do not vary with seniority in this contract 
(other than for probationary employees) or with other characteristics that might 
vary systematically across plants. 
9. For example, we calculate from the 1984 Current Population Displaced 
Worker Survey that only 5 percent of those who lost their jobs between 1979 and 
1983 moved to take a job or to look for work. This is consistent with estimates that 
only about 6 percent of the displaced workers who received Trade Adjustment 
Assistance even took the relocation, resources to which they were entitled (Swigart, 
1984]. 
10. Even if one believes that differences in average wage levels in each 
community simply reflect cost-of-living differences, the gap between plant wages 
and area wages still varies across plants and represents the potential loss associated 
with dismissal, in this case varying with living costs. See Topel 119861 for arguments 
about the causes of differences in market wages across local labor markets. 
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varies across the plants in this company from zero (where plant 
wages are no higher than the area rate) to as much as 100 percent 
above the area rate. We recognize that because these premiums are 
not set unilaterally by the employer, there is no reason to believe 
that they will necessarily generate cost-effective reductions in 
shirking. Nevertheless, if the underlying theory is correct, the 
premiums should lead to some reduction in shirking regardless of 
what produced them, and the reductions in shirking should vary 
directly with the size of the premium. 
Wage profiles that increase the returns associated with senior-
ity and, in turn, provide incentives to avoid shirking and dismissal 
in order to capture those returns [Lazear, 1979] may provide an 
alternative to the use of efficiency wages. The presence of these 
seniority-based wage profiles can complicate tests of efficiency 
arguments because of the need to sort out the effects associated 
with current wage premiums from those associated with seniority 
profiles. This is especially so where data are taken across employers 
because these wage profiles may differ substantially across employ-
ers. The analysis in this case is simplified because wages in this 
company do not differ by seniority, eliminating that compli-
cation.11 The absence of seniority-based wages, however, makes it 
more difficult to generalize conclusions from this case to firms that 
do have such wage profiles. 
In addition to the lost wage premium, the costs associated with 
dismissal include the search costs associated with finding a new 
job, and these also vary across geographic areas and plants. Where 
unemployment is higher, dismissed workers may have to search 
longer or may have to move to other communities before finding a 
job. Labor performance, broadly defined, should be higher, and 
shirking lower where the expected costs associated with dismissal 
are greatest: where wages in the outside labor market are lower 
and the difficulty associated with finding a new job is greater. 
There may be more than one mechanism through which a 
wage premium affects performance and labor costs. For example, a 
wage premium may reduce voluntary turnover [Pencavel, 1970; 
Phelps, 1970; Salop, 1979]; Leonard [1987] and Krueger and 
Summers [1987] find evidence for this effect. Reductions in 
voluntary turnover may be a less important issue empirically in 
this case because voluntary turnover is less of a cost to firms in 
11. We attempt to control for nonwage returns from seniority by including a 
variable to measure plant seniority; the relationship between seniority and any 
nonwage returns is covered by the contract and should be constant within the firm. 
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unskilled jobs like most in this industry where workers can easily 
be replaced. Efficiency wages may also lead to the selection of better 
employees with higher productivity [Malcomson, 1981; Weiss, 
1980], but the selection nexus appears to be a very different type of 
effect because it operates not on current employees but through the 
selection of new ones. The mechanism most central to the basic 
concern of efficiency arguments—providing incentives for current 
workers to maintain peformance—is through a reduction in shirk-
ing [Stiglitz, 1976; Solow, 1979; Shapiro and Stiglitz, 1984]. The 
empirical problem is to find direct measures of shirking at the 
workplace. Overall labor productivity measures, for example, may 
not be good proxies for shirking even across plants in the same firm 
because they can be dominated by factors other than individual 
worker performance, such as short-run problems with equipment 
or with supplies, changes in techniques and in products, union-
management conflicts, etc. 
Fortunately, we have a very precise measure of shirking taken 
from the company's internal records: The rate at which workers 
were dismissed at each plant for disciplinary reasons (DISL).12 The 
costs associated with dismissals are exactly the mechanism behind 
the shirking model of efficiency wages. Further, we can be reason-
ably certain that these disciplinary actions in fact result from poor 
performance and productivity, broadly defined (e.g., low perfor-
mance levels, tardiness, absenteeism, breaking safety procedures, 
bad relations with supervisors or fellow workers, etc.). The United 
Auto Workers' contract with the employer limits management's 
ability to discipline employees to such performance-related issues, 
and as enforced by a strong union and grievance procedures, these 
restrictions effectively eliminate arbitrary and capricious actions. 
These disciplinary actions are expressed as a rate per plant 
calculated as the number of dismissals/the number of workers for 
the year 1982. 
Given standai-dized discipline policies within the firm, the rate 
of disciplinary dismissals should reflect the incidence of shirking at 
each plant which should in turn be a function of the utility 
associated with shirking for workers at each plant. Following 
Shapiro and Stiglitz [1984], that utility U, should be lower where 
the expected value of alternative employment E(w') is lower and 
12. The measure of dismissals may include cases where the union has filed a 
grievance and secured reinstatement of a dismissed worker through arbitration. 
The number of workers ultimately dismissed may therefore be somewhat lower. 
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the utility associated with being dismissed Ub is also lower, given a 
constant probability of being caught shirking and dismissed P and 
constant rates of voluntary turnover across workers: 
(1) rUs = (1 - P)w - P[E(wa) - Ub], 
where 
w = current wage 
wa = alternative wage, 
r = discount rate used to evaluate the utility. 
We assume that r is distributed across individuals = N(ur^) 
and can be thought of as determining the preferences for shirking; 
higher values of r are associated with higher utility from shirking 
(greater weight placed on the gains from reduced effort until 
caught). We also assume that dUJdw > 0, d2UJcPw < 0. Each 
worker will adjust their work behavior such that dUJd (p[E(wa) -
Ub] = dUJdw. At the efficiency wage w*, dUJw/UJw = 1. Some 
workers may shirk at the efficiency wage equiHbrium because of 
the heterogeneity of discount rates. 
The utility associated with being dismissed and unemployed 
(Ub) is measured by the maximum amount of unemployment 
benefits payable to dismissed workers (level x duration, UIBEN) 
which vary by state and therefore across plants. (Workers dis-
charged for willful or deliberate misconduct—above and beyond 
simple shirking—may lose some period of eligibility for benefits.)13 
The expected value of alternative employment E(wa) is determined 
in part by the costs associated with finding a new job. The extent of 
unemployment across plants affects the probability and costs of 
finding alternative employment. It is measured first by the rate of 
13. The fact that an employer says that a discharge was for cause does not 
necessarily constitute dismissal for misconduct for the purposes of unemployment 
insurance. State unemployment agencies review discharge claims, and in general, 
discipline problems must go beyond ordinary negligence, inefficiency, and poor 
performance to include willful, deliberate misconduct in order to be classified as 
dismissed for misconduct. Workers whose dismissals meet the unemployment 
insurance misconduct test lose some weeks of eligibility for benefits (the level of 
benefits is unaffected) with the number of weeks lost rising according to the severity 
of the misconduct—up to 26 weeks for felony crimes, e.g. See U. S. Department of 
Labor [1990] for details. Workers dismissed for poor performance (shirking) are 
generally eligible for full benefits while even those dismissed for gross misconduct, 
such as felony convictions, lose only some of their eligibility. Because the basic 
framework for eligibility is dictated by the Federal Social Security Act, the 
variations in administrative practices across states are relatively minor. The 
potential loss of some eligibility creates incentives for workers to keep any 
misconduct on the more moderate side of the discipline distribution. 
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unemployment at each plant-—the percentage of workers currently 
on layoff (LAIDOFF), many of whom are looking for jobs (perhaps 
temporary jobs given that historically, most laid-off workers have 
eventually been recalled). In larger labor markets the number of 
workers laid off at the plant may have only a marginal effect on the 
prospect of finding jobs, but it can have a disproportionate effect on 
the perceptions of workers concerning those prospects. We also 
include the unemployment rate in the SMSA CUE) to help capture 
the state of the labor market for other jobs. A measure of average 
seniority (SEN) at the plant—percent of workers < 10 years— 
provides a rough proxy for age-related marketability; other things 
equal, workers with more seniority are older and have more 
difficulty in securing new employment. Workers with more senior-
ity also lose seniority-related benefits if dismissed, and this may 
offset the reduced disincentive to shirk associated with having less 
time remaining on the job (given mandatory retirement) and 
therefore a shorter period in which to benefit from wage premiums. 
Plants with more senior workers may also experience less shirking 
because they have already identified and dismissed workers with a 
disposition toward discipline problems, in contrast to plants with 
more new and untested employees where workers with those 
dispositions may not yet have been identified. 
Finally, the wage for alternative jobs (wu) is measured by 
average wages paid in each SMSA for production work. We define 
the wage premium, WPREM, as w — wa, and the effect of the wage 
premium on shirking, UJ{ WPREM) < 0 if the efficiency argument 
dominates; it could be > 0 if the income effect dominates or — 0 if 
the rationalization associated with equity theory holds (also if 
efficiency and income effects both have zero effects or cancel out). 
There are several potentially important influences on disci-
pline rates across plants that are exogenous to the efficiency wage 
model. The first relates to characteristics of the plant and of the 
type of work performed in it. Jobs in assembly plants are also 
thought to be more oppressive than those in other plants because 
the work is more heavily dominated by the assembly line and 
workers have less ability to influence their work. Discipline prob-
lems may be more common in these plants as a result. We include a 
variable to identify assembly plants (ASSMBLY) and expect it to 
vary positively with discipline rates. However, jobs in assembly 
operations where work is highly automated may on average be less 
skilled than those in component manufacturing, and wages in the 
INTERPLANT TEST OF THE EFFICIENCY WAGE HYPOTHESIS 779 
outside market should therefore be lower for jobs in the former 
than in the latter. If this is so, then the wage premium might be 
greater for assembly workers (because wages are the same across 
types of plants), reducing the incentive for these workers to shirk 
and working against the effect hypothesized above. 
In addition, some industry observers believe that worker 
attitudes and behavior such as militancy and worker discipline 
vary by region of the country. A variable is included to identify 
plants in the Michigan area which are older and often have 
histories of conflict (MICHIGAN); plants in the south (SOUTH) 
are newer and, many believe have more compliant, disciplined 
work forces. Plants in other areas—mainly in the Midwest— 
constitute the omitted category. 
An additional factor affecting the variance in shirking behavior 
across plants may be associated with Hirschman's [1970] and 
Freeman's [1980a] "voice" argument. If shirking, as psychologists 
argue, is in part a reaction against pi'oblems at the workplace (i.e., 
absenteeism as a form of withdrawal from an unpleasant situa-
tion), arrangements that give workers an alternative means for 
addressing those problems could reduce the incidence of shirking. 
All plants have the same mechanisms—union representation, 
grievance procedures, etc.—but they may not function equally 
well. Fortunately, we have a unique measure of the effectiveness of 
these voice arrangements across plants. Corporate-level manage-
ment rated the problem-solving ability of local unions and manage-
ment at each plant (VOICE) using a ten-point scale (1 = confronta-
tional relations; 10 = cooperative, problem-solvingrelations). Where 
shirking behavior is a reaction against problems at the workplace, 
we expect less shirking at plants where union-management rela-
tions provide a more effective mechanism for solving workplace 
problems. These variables, their means, and standard deviations 
are presented in Table I. 
One potentially important omitted variable may be a compari-
son of the level of fringe benefits between the plants and their 
outside labor markets. These benefits represent a significant aspect 
of compensation, and as Freeman [1980b] notes, fringe benefits are 
correlated with wages that could bias a wage measure upward. 
Given that fringe benefits vary with wages, it may be best to think 
of the wage premium as measuring compensation: both wages and 
benefits. It is not obvious what other kinds of variables are omitted: 
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TABLE I 
VARIABLE DEFINITIONS, MEAN VALUES, AND STANDARD DEVIATIONS 
Variable Definition Mean S.D. 
DISL 
Rate of worker dismissals for disciplin- 0.0968 0.0' 
ary reasons 
Average hourly wage in 1982 for pro- $ 10.58 1.5 
duction workers in each plant's 
SMSA 
WPREM 
The wage premium for each plant de- $ 2.92 1.5 
fined as the average hourly company 
wage—W„ 
WPREM'70 
The wage premium for each plant in 1.03 0.4 
1970 as defined above 
UE 
Unemployment rate in the SMSA in 13.06 4.0 
which the plant is located 
LAIDOFF 
Percentage of workers on layoff 25.47 14.7 
SEN 
Percentage of workers with less than 45.08 18.8 
ten years of seniority 
VOICE 
Corporate assessment of cooperative re- 6.96 1.4 
lations/problem-solving at plant 
(1 - least cooperative; 10 = roost) 
ASSMBLY 
Dummy variable for assembly plants 0.23 0.4 
MICHIGAN 
Dummy variable for plants in Michigan 0.60 0.5 
SOUTH 
Dummy variable for plants in the South 0.06 0.2 
UIBEN 
Maximum state unemployment insur- $4,928.31 1,044.3 
ance benefits by plant location 
SMSA data From U. S. Bureau ofI»ahor Statistics 1982 Area Wogc Surveys. Unemployment data are front 
Employment and Etirnrngs 11982) and from Highlights of State Unemployment- Compensation Laws f1983]. All 
other data >«*e from internal company records for 1982. 
while it may be that some workers may be more inclined to shirk, 
ceteris paribus, there is certainly no consensus as to what charac-
teristics determine that inclination and no a priori reason to believe 
that they would be correlated with the right-hand-side variables. 
The incidence of shirking as measured by disciplinary layoffs 
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across plants can be estimated as follows: 
(2) In [DISL/1 - DISLj = a - 6,WPREM - 62UE 
- o3LAIDOFF + 64SEN - 65VOICE + &6ASSMBLY 
+ o7MICHIGAN - 68SOUTH + 69UIBEN + e. 
Plant-level data based on the average characteristics of the 
individual workers in each plant are especially susceptible to 
heteroskedasticity because the error term varies inversely with the 
number of workers employed in the plant: where N — workers in 
each of k plants, E{e\) = l/N2kE[[lJ2] = s2/Nk. As Amemiya and 
Nold [1975] note, the weighting used to correct for heteroskedastic-
ity should be modified in log odds regressions to include an 
equation error as a measure of omitted variables. Otherwise, the 
standard errors of the estimates will be underestimated, and the 
efficiency of those estimates reduced. Each observation was 
weighted by [sz0LS + (EMPLOYMENT/ DISL,(1 - DISL,))-1r1K, 
where SQIS is an estimate of the variance calculated from the 
parameters of an OLS estimation of the above log odds equation, 
and EMPLOYMENT^ is the number of workers at each of k plants. 
The log odds equation was estimated again using the weighted 
observations. 
V. RESULTS 
The results in Table II provide empirical support for the 
efficiency wage hypothesis as applied to shirking. The wage pre-
mium (WPREM) suggests that there are fewer shirking-related 
discipline problems where wage premiums are higher. This relation-
ship dominates any income effects or any of the rationalization 
associated with equity theory that may be nested in the model and 
that would operate in the opposite direction. 
There is also support for the argument that the costs associ-
ated with dismissal in addition to the loss of the wage premium 
influence the incidence of shirking. Those costs include the pros-
pects for reemployment as measured by layoff rates across plants 
(LAIDOFF) and seniority/age-related job prospects (SEN).14 The 
fact that the costs associated with unemployment could provide 
such discipline is an old argument in economics that goes back at 
14. To examine whether the variance in layoff rates across plants is driven by a 
variance in management practices which, in turn, could also account for the 
difference in discipline rates across plants, we ran the above regression without the 
LAIDOFF variable. The results (see Appendix) are virtually unchanged. 
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T A B L E II 
REGRESSION RESULTS FOB RVTES OF DISCIPLINARY LAYOFFS ACROSS PLANTS 
L(Dependent variable = In DISL/1 - DISDl 
Weighted least squares Elasticity* 
(1) (2) (3) 
Intercpt -1.071 -1.20 — 
(0.96) (1.16) 
WPREM -0.21** -0.24* 0.547 
(0.10) (0.13) 
UE -0.03 -0.012 0.330 
(0.04) (0.045) 
LAIDOFF -0.009* •-0.008* 0.207 
(0.005) (0.005) 
SEN 0.007" 0.008* 0.285 
(0.004) (0.004) 
VOICE -0.14*** -0.14*** 0.908 
(0.054) (0.05) 
ASSMBLY 1.008*** 1.02*** 0.210 
(0.182) (0.18) 
MICI-IIGAN 0.09 0.289 0.053 
(0.238) (0.24) 
SOUTH 0.054 -0.057 0.003 
(0.336) (0.36) 
UIBEN -0.00004 -0.00006 0.178 
(0.00009) (0.00009) 
WPREM'70 0.37 0.291 
(0.54) 
S.E.E. « 0.62 0.61 
F = 6.43 6.32 
n = 78 78 
• - significantat 10 percent. 
*• = significant at 5 percent. 
*** = significant at 1 percent (two-tailed tests). 
All of the values for DISL lie between zero and one. Standard errors axe in p;u-ontb.eses. TJi» proportion of 
the variance in DISL explained by regressions 1 and 2 is 46 and 49 percent, respectively, 
a. Evaluated at the mean from the weighted regression in equation 12). 
least to Marx's [1978] notion of an "industrial reserve army." In 
addition, the quality of the relationship between plant manage-
ment and the local union (VOICE) has a significant effect on the 
incidence of shirking, perhaps providing a means for solving 
problems that might otherwise contribute to discipline rates. 
Finally, assembly plants (ASSMBLY) are associated with signifi-
cantly higher discipline levels, perhaps because workers there have 
more to lose from, dismissal or perhaps because the work there may 
be more difficult. The other variables were not significant. 
The wage premium result (although not the unemployment 
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result) is also consistent with a different mechanism: the selection 
of better workers. Higher wage premiums may lead to larger 
queues of workers and possibly to the selection of better workers 
who, for example, may have less initial preference for shirking. But 
tins mechanism relies on a relative wage premium not at the 
current date but when the present work force was hired. While the 
premiums in the two periods are probably not identical, it is 
possible that the variable for the 1982 premium is positively 
correlated with the hiring premium and could be picking up some 
of the effects associated with the latter. 
VI. EXAMINING AN ALTERNATIVE HYPOTHESIS 
We attempt to examine the potential effect of a wage premium 
on selection first by calculating the wage premium across plants for 
the year 1970. Given median seniority of twelve years in our 1982 
data, this corresponds to the year the median employee was hired. 
The wage premium in 1970 (WPREM'70) was calculated in the 
same way as was the 1982 premium, and we enter it along with the 
1982 premium into equation (2). The results are reported in Table 
II and suggest that the wage premium at the point of hire did not 
have a significant effect on discipline rates. Indeed, the effect is in 
the wrong direction. The current premium, however, retains its 
significance and the expected sign, suggesting that it is not driven 
by selection effects. 
These results are consistent with the basic shirking argument 
that the costs of dismissal, including the loss of a wage premium, 
create incentives that reduce shirking. The more difficult question 
is whether the wage premium is in fact a cost-effective way of 
reducing shirking. In other words, does the optimality condition for 
efficiency wages hold? As noted above, because wage levels and the 
premiums that result are not set unilaterally by the firm, we would 
not necessarily expect the premiums to optimize the reduction in 
shirking. It might still be interesting, though, to try to estimate the 
value of the reduction in shirking. 
The best way to estimate the benefits of the reduction in 
shirking associated with wage premiums would be to estimate a 
production function that includes the discipline rate as a right-hand-
side variable. Ideally, such tests might also include measures of any 
reductions in turnover associated with wage premiums in order to 
assess the relative importance of these different efficiency wage 
mechanisms. Unfortunately, we do not have the data to estimate a 
production function consistent with the relationships examined 
above or to draw comparisons with turnover. 
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Instead, we must rely on less direct measures. As measured by 
the elasticities reported in Table II, the relationship with the 
market wage is second only to voice in its effect on discipline rates. 
But the dollar comparisons tell a more complicated story, A one 
dollar increase in the wage premium over market rates at a 
representative plant of 1,000 workers would lead to 16.5 fewer 
disciplinary actions per year.15 The wage costs alone of that dollar 
increase, however, total well over $2 million per year, or approxi-
mately $121,000 per disciplinary action. 
While this may appear to be an expensive means of reducing 
shirking, it is difficult to know the total benefits associated with a 
reduction in discipline cases. A company representative suggested 
that the administrative costs alone associated with a dismissal can 
ran as high as $75,000.1G The costs of the incidents leading to 
discipline vary depending on the cause but could be high, for 
example, if the cause was sabotage. More important, wage premi-
ums may lead to a reduction in unobserved shirking—-unobserved 
because of the imperfect monitoring of employee behavior—and if 
we assume that only a relatively small proportion of shirkers are 
caught, this reduction could be substantial. The uncertainty 
associated with these benefits makes their value vary with the risk 
preferences of the employer. Finally, there may also be benefits 
from the wage premium in addition to the reduction in shirking, 
such as reductions in turnover, which are not measured here. 
VI. CONCLUSIONS 
Efficiency wage arguments rely on a largely untested relation-
ship between wage premiums and worker productivity. The argu-
ments above find evidence supporting the assertion that wage 
premiums are associated with reductions in shirking as nxeasured 
by discipline rates. The wage premium appears to provide incen-
tives to avoid dismissal rather than leading to the selection of 
workers less inclined to shirk. Factors such as the level of 
unemployment in the local labor market and the seniority of the 
work force also influence the costs associated with dismissal and 
15. Part of the reason is that unions invariably file grievances against all 
dismissals, and the administrative costs of a full grievance procedure are high. 
Further, management loses a nontrivial share of these grievances and must pay 
back wages for the period since the discharge, often a year or more. Dismissals may 
also raise the experience rating costs associated with unemployment insurance. All 
of these costs must be included in the expected costs of a discharge. 
16. The new disciplinary rate = e71 + ed, where d = In (DISL/1 - DISL) + 
(6k.)(WPREM). The change in discipline rates varies with the initial level of the rate 
and is evaluated here at the mean. 
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are similarly related to the level of shirking. Finally, discipline 
rates are also lower in plants where the union and management are 
better able to resolve their problems. It is difficult to identify the 
value of the reduction in shirking associated with a given wage 
premium, but it does seem that there could be nontrivial returns 
associated with a wage premium. 
APPENDIX: SUPPLEMENTARY REGRESSION RESULTS FOR RATES OF DISCIPLINARY 
LAYOFFS ACROSS PLANTS 
Dependent variable: In (disciplinary rate/1 — disciplinary rate) 
Weighted least squares 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Intercpt -1.48** -1.67 -2.23** -1.59 -1.331 
(0.50) (0.54) (0.88) (1.16) (1.24) 
WPREM -0.14** -0.25** -0.20* -0.25* -0.23* 
(0.06) (0.12) (0.11) (0.13) (0.13) 
UE -0.02 -0.006 -0.01 
(0.04) (0.05) (0.047) 
LAIDOFF -0.009* -0.009* -0.008* -0.01* 
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
SEN 0.007* 0.008** 0.005 0.01 s* 0.004* 
(0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.0075) 
VOICE -0.14*** -0.15*** -0.14*** -0.14*** 
(0.52) (0.052) (0.053) (0.054) 
ASSMBLY 1.03*** 1.015*** 1.09*** 1.08*** 0.94*** 
(0.17) (0.18) (0.19) (0.18) (0.23) 
MICHIGAN 0.122 0.18 0.06 0.31 0.28 
(0.18) (0.19) (0.25) (0.24) (0.25) 
SOUTH 0.02 0.05 -0.17 -0.01 -0.067 
(0.32) (0.32) (0.33) (0.36) (0.36) 
UIBEN 0.00006 -0.00006 -0.00006 
(0.00009) (0.00009) (0.00009) 




S E N ^ -0.005 
(0.008) 
SEE 0.62 0.62 0.62 0.62 0.61 
n = 78 78 78 78 78 
a. SKILL = percentage of plant work force with craft stills. 
b .SEN15 » percentugeof plant work force with seniority less than 15 years. 
Equation (5) contains all of the variables available from the data set. 
* = sitfni6cant at 10 percent level. 
*• = significant at 5 percent level. 
*** = significant nt 1 percent level (two-tailed tests). 
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